# **Macroeconomics of Exchange Rates**

Lecture 1 Exchange Rates and International Relative Prices

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## Introduction

- Real exchange rate (RER) measures relative price levels across countries
  - $\circ\,$  or deviations from purchasing power parity (PPP)
- Why are we interested in RER, in particular, in its dynamics?
  - an artificial construct, not an actual relative price in any market
  - $\circ\,$  yet, it is a crucial diagnostic variable for our models in both goods and assets
- RER is also one of the most starkly-behaved variables:
  - co-moves tightly with the nominal exchange rate
  - and is virtually uncorrelated with most other macroeconomic fundamentals, real or nominal
- This offers sharp testable implications for models, which has resulted in a number of puzzles: PPP, Backus-Smith, Mussa
- RER is also inherently a general-equilibrium object

# **DEFINITIONS AND FACTS**

# Nominal Exchange Rate (NER)

- Nominal ER is the relative price of currencies
  - $\circ~\mathcal{E}_t =$  units of home currency for one unit of foreign currency
  - $\mathcal{E}_t \uparrow (\downarrow)$  is home depreciation (appreciation)
  - $\circ \ e_t \equiv \log \mathcal{E}_t \text{ is the log of NER}$
  - $\Delta e_t \equiv e_t e_{t-1}$  is nominal depreciation in log points
  - bilateral vs (trade) weighted exchange rates

• Under floating, et follows a process close to a random walk

- ER depreciations are nearly unpredictable,  $\mathbb{E}_t \Delta e_{t+1} \approx 0$ , and the current level offers the best forecast,  $\mathbb{E}_t e_{t+h} \approx e_t$  for h > 0
  - a number of departures from pure random walk
- ER changes  $\Delta e_t$  exhibit *no* robust contemporaneous correlation with macro aggregates (Meese and Rogoff puzzle)
- Macroeconomists view ER as "excessively" volatile, while finance economists as "insufficiently" volatile
  - an order of magnitude more volatile than macro aggregates
  - two thirds as volatile as the stock market

## Real Exchange Rate

Real ER is the relative price of consumption baskets

$$\mathcal{Q}_t \equiv rac{\mathcal{E}_t P_t^*}{P_t}, \qquad ext{or in logs} \quad q_t \equiv e_t + p_t^* - p_t$$

- $P_t$  and  $P_t^*$  are consumer price levels at home and abroad
- $Q_t \uparrow$  is *real depreciation*, a decline in the *relative* purchasing power of one unit of currency abroad
- consumer vs producer vs cost-based RER
- We focus on the dynamics of RER:

$$\Delta q_t = \Delta e_t + \pi_t^* - \pi_t,$$

•  $\pi_t = \log P_t - \log P_{t-1}$  is home CPI inflation

 $\circ$  monetarist view:  $\Delta e_t \sim \pi_t - \pi_t^*$ , and thus  $q_t$  stationary

# Main empirical facts about RER

(unconditional moments)

RER is nearly indistinguishable from NER at most horizons, that is follows a volatile near-random-walk process

- very long half-lives (PPP Puzzle), no mean reversion?

- 2 all RERs (CPI, PPI, wage-based, tradable) comove closely, with similar volatility and persistence
- 8 RER is almost an order of magnitude more volatile than macro aggregates, includion inflation, consumption and output
  - weakly negatively correlated w/consumption (BS puzzle)
  - o/w, like NER, nearly uncorrelated with macro fundamentals
- RER comoves closely with NER not only under a float, but changes its properties with a switch to peg (Mussa puzzle)


# Terms of Trade

• ToT measure the relative price of imports and exports:


$$\mathcal{S}_t = \frac{P_{Ft}}{P_{Ht}^* \mathcal{E}_t}$$

- $P_{Ft}(P_{Ht}^*)$  is home (foreign) import price index in local currency
- $\circ S_t$  is the relative price of imports in units of exports
- $S_t \uparrow$  is ToT *deterioration* (more exports for one unit of imports)
- ToT and RER (in particular, ToT deterioration and real depreciation) are often confused
  - o in many models the two variables are closely linked
  - this is not, however, the case in the data: RER depreciations are not always accompanied by significant ToT deteriorations
  - ToT is about 2-3 times less volatile than RER and the two are only weakly positively correlated
  - ToT is an actual relative price, while RER is not quite


# Empirical illustrations



#### **Empirical illustrations**



#### Empirical illustrations





Exchange rates and the price ratio between the U.S. and Europe. Note: the real exchange rate is  $eP^+/P$ , where the nominal exchange rate *e* is the U.S. dollar price of a basket of European currencies,  $P^+$  is an aggregate of European CPIs, and P is the U.S. CPL The price ratio is  $P^+/P$ 

# RER AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIVE PRICES PPP HYPOTHESIS

# **PPP** Hypothesis

- PPP hypothesis: prices of consumption baskets equalized in space; one dollar buys the same quantity of goods everywhere
- Three forms of the PPP hypothesis
  - **1** Absolute PPP: equality of the price levels,  $P_t = P_t^* \mathcal{E}_t$ , which implies  $\mathcal{Q}_t \equiv 1$ , or in logs  $q_t \equiv 0$ .
    - in general, RER equals PPP deviations
  - 2 Relative PPP: nominal depreciation equals relative inflation,  $\Delta e_t = \pi_t - \pi_t^*$ , that is RER is constant over time,  $\Delta q_t \equiv 0$ .
  - Weak relative PPP: mean reversion in relative price levels, or equivalently (mean) stationarity of q<sub>t</sub>
    - $\Delta e_t = \pi_t \pi_t^*$  holds over long time intervals

#### Relative PPP

- Express inflation rate as:  $\pi_t = \Delta p_t = \sum_{i \in \Omega_t} \omega_{it} \Delta p_{it}$
- Then real exchange rate can be written as:

$$\Delta q_t = \Delta e_t + \sum_{i \in \Omega_t^*} \omega_{it}^* \Delta p_{it}^* - \sum_{i \in \Omega_t} \omega_{it} \Delta p_{it}$$

- Lemma 1 The relative PPP holds if the following three conditions are simultaneously satisfied:
  - (i) all goods are traded,  $\Omega_t = \Omega_t^*$ ;
  - (ii) there is no home bias,  $\omega_{it} = \omega_{it}^*$  for all  $i \in \Omega_t = \Omega_t^*$ ;
  - (iii) the law of one price (LOP) holds, at least in changes

$$\Delta p_{it} = \Delta p_{it}^* + \Delta e_t$$
 for all  $i \in \Omega_t = \Omega_t^*$ 

- Two types of LOP deviations:
  - "Long-run" due to variable markups
  - 2 "Short-run" due to sticky prices

## Three remarks

1 Lemma is a set of sufficient requirements for  $\Delta q_t = 0$ ; or alternative necessary conditions for PPP violations,  $\Delta q_t \neq 0$ 

— guidance for both theory and empirics

- 2 The macroeconomic concept of PPP is often motivated with a microeconomic concept of LOP
  - LOP is one of the conditions in the Lemma
  - however, LOP neither ensures PPP, nor is strictly necessary!
  - the main source of PPP violations is not LOP violations (see below)
- **3** Lemma illustrates why PPP hypothesis is a very tall order
  - why then PPP hypothesis plays such a prominent role?
  - why the idea of a stationary RER is so profoundly rooted in the literature?
  - deep assumption of monetary-driven RER

# **NON-TRADABLES**

#### Non-Tradables

• Price index with tradables and non-tradables:

$$p_t = (1 - \omega)p_{Tt} + \omega p_{Nt}$$

• in log deviations from steady state (special case of  $\pi_t$  above)

• Engel (1999) decomposition:

$$q_{t} = \underbrace{\left(p_{T_{t}}^{*} + e_{t} - p_{T_{t}}\right)}_{\equiv q_{t}^{T} \text{ (tradable RER)}} + \underbrace{\omega\left[\left(p_{N_{t}}^{*} - p_{T_{t}}^{*}\right) - \left(p_{N_{t}} - p_{T_{t}}\right)\right]}_{\equiv v_{t}^{N} \text{ (relative price of N)}}$$

- general decomposition where  $v_t^N$  is the non-tradable "residual" •  $v_t^N$  is double-difference (N relative to T, relative to foreign)
- If LOP holds for tradables,  $p_{Tt}^* + e_t = p_{Tt}$ , then:

$$q_t^{\mathcal{T}} \equiv 0$$
 and  $q_t = v_t^{\mathcal{N}}$ 

## Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis

#### • Assumptions:

**1** Marginal-cost pricing under linear technology:

$$p_{it} = w_t - a_{it}$$
 for  $i \in \Omega = \{T, N\},$   
 $p_{jt}^* = w_t^* - a_{jt}^*$  for  $j \in \Omega^* = \{T, N^*\}$ 

**2** LOP for tradables:  $p_{Tt} = p_{Tt}^* + e_t$ 

Relative wage rates are determined in the tradable sector:

$$q_t^W = w_t^* + e_t - w_t = a_{Tt}^* - a_{Tt}$$

• The relative price of non-tradables is then:

$$p_{Nt} - p_{Tt} = a_{Tt} - a_{Nt}$$


• And, therefore, RER is given by:

$$q_t = v_t^N = \omega v_t^N$$
, where  $v_t^N \equiv (a_{Tt}^* - a_{Nt}^*) - (a_{Tt} - a_{Nt})$ 

## **Empirical Test and Implications**

- Variance decomposition of  $q_t = q_t^T + v_t^N$  shows that  $q_t^T$  accounts for the bulk of the variance in  $q_t$ , even 10 years out
  - intuitively,  $q_t^T$  contains  $e_t$ , while  $v_t^N$  is based on  $p_{Nt} p_{Tt}$  (i.e., relative price in the same geography which tends to be smooth)
- This puts emphasis on the tradable LOP deviation term  $q_t^T = p_{Tt}^* + e_t p_{Tt}$  for understanding RER
- Nonetheless, the non-tradable theory of RER works well in three special case:
  - 1 between very rich and very poor countries (large cross section)
  - 2 over "growth miracles" (after-war Japan; long time series)
  - **3** in currency unions/under pegs (when  $e_t$  is switched off)
  - also may apply in policy counterfactuals (how  $c_t \downarrow \Rightarrow q_t \uparrow$ )


#### Empirical illustrations (Rogoff 1996)



(0.090) (0.042)

Source: The Penn World Table, Aug. 1994

#### Empirical illustrations (Rogoff 1996)



 $\label{eq:Figure 4. Yen/U.S. \ CPI and \ WPI based real exchange rates: Jan. 1960–Apr. 1995 \\ Source: International Financial Statistics$ 

# HOME BIAS IN TRADABLES

## Home Bias in Tradables

• Generalize previous setup with home bias in tradables:

$$p_{Tt} = (1 - \tilde{\gamma})p_{Ht} + \tilde{\gamma}p_{Ft},$$
  
$$p_{Tt}^* = (1 - \tilde{\gamma})p_{Ft}^* + \tilde{\gamma}p_{Ht}^*$$

• sets of goods now  $\Omega = \{H, F, N\}$  and  $\Omega^* = \{F, H, N^*\}$ , so that  $\Omega \neq \Omega^*$  and  $\omega_H = (1 - \tilde{\gamma})(1 - \omega) \neq \tilde{\gamma}(1 - \omega) = \omega_H^*$ 

• Still assuming LOP and MC-pricing:

$$\begin{aligned} q_t^T &\equiv p_{Tt}^* + e_t - p_{Tt} = (1 - 2\tilde{\gamma})q_t^P, \\ q_t^P &\equiv p_{Ft}^* + e_t - p_{Ht} = q_t^W - (a_{Tt}^* - a_{Tt}), \\ v_t^N &= \nu_t^N + 2\tilde{\gamma}q_t^P \end{aligned}$$

 $\circ$  note that under LOP,  $q_t^P = s_t$  (i.e., PPI-RER equals ToT)

# Real Exchange Rate

- RER is still given by  $q_t = q_t^T + \omega v_t^N$ , therefore we have:
- **Proposition 1** With competitive pricing, in the presence of home bias  $\tilde{\gamma} \leq 1/2$  and non-tradables  $\omega \geq 0$ , RER is given by:

$$q_t = (1 - 2\gamma) \big[ q_t^W - (a_{Tt}^* - a_{Tt}) \big] + \omega \nu_t^N,$$

where  $\gamma \equiv \tilde{\gamma}(1-\omega)$  is aggregate foreign share and  $\nu_t^N$  is the relative non-tradable productivity.

- Aggregate home bias  $\gamma < 1/2$  is essential. Sources:
  - o trade costs, distribution costs, intermediate inputs
  - heterogeneous  $\tilde{\gamma}_i$
- Tradable  $q_t^T$  may comove closely with  $e_t, q_t, q_t^W$ 
  - even without any micro-level LOP deviations
  - $\circ~$  essentials: home bias in tradables  $\tilde{\gamma}$  and volatile  $q^W_t$

# VARIABLE MARKUPS AND PRICING TO MARKET

## PTM and LOP deviations

• Markup identities:

$$p_{Ht}(i) = \mu_{it} + mc_{it},$$
  
 $p_{Ht}^{*}(i) = \mu_{it}^{*} + mc_{it} - e_t + \tau_i.$ 

• LOP deviation:

$$\Delta q_{Ht}(i) \equiv \Delta p_{Ht}^*(i) + \Delta e_t - \Delta p_{Ht}(i)$$
  
=  $\Delta \mu_{it}^* - \Delta \mu_{it}.$ 

• Empirical test:

- project  $\Delta q_{Ht}(i)$  on  $\Delta e_t$
- Fitzgerald and Haller (2013) find close comovement (even conditional on price adjustment)

#### Pricing to Market

• A model of the markup:

$$\mu_{it} = \mathcal{M}(p_{Ht}(i) - p_t), \quad \text{with} \quad \mathcal{M}'(\cdot) < 0$$

• Then pricing equations:

 $p_{Ht}(i) = (1 - \alpha)mc_{it} + \alpha p_t,$   $p_{Ht}^*(i) = (1 - \alpha)(mc_{it} - e_t) + \alpha p_t^*,$   $\alpha \equiv \frac{-\mathcal{M}'(p_{Ht}(i) - p_t)}{1 - \mathcal{M}'(p_{Ht}(i) - p_t)} \in [0, 1) \text{ is strategic complementarity}$   $\circ (1 - \alpha) \text{ is the cost pass-through elasticity}$ 

• LOP deviations are common across products *i* (common *α*):

$$q_{Ht} = p_{Ht}^*(i) + e_t - p_{Ht}(i) = \alpha q_t,$$
$$q_{Ft} = p_{Ft}^*(i) + e_t - p_{Ft}(i) = \alpha q_t$$

#### RER and ToT

(with home bias,  $\gamma = ilde{\gamma} < 1/2$ )

• Using defintions:

$$q_t^P \equiv p_{Ft}^* + e_t - p_{Ht}$$
 and  $s_t \equiv p_{Ft} - p_{Ht}^* - e_t$ 

• Two relationships between relative prices are:  $q_t^P = s_t + (q_{Ht} + q_{Ft}) = s_t + 2\alpha q_t,$  $q_t = (1 - \gamma)q_t^P - \gamma s_t.$ 

Proposition 2 The relationship between RERs and ToT:

$$s_t = rac{1-2lpha(1-\gamma)}{1-2\gamma} q_t \qquad ext{and} \qquad q_t^P = rac{1-2lpha\gamma}{1-2\gamma} q_t.$$

 $\circ$  Without PTM (lpha=0):  $s_t=q_t^P=rac{1}{1-2\gamma}q_t$ 

 $\circ~$  PTM and LOP deviations help explain  $(q_t^P, s_t)$  relative to  $q_t$ 

relative volatility vs correlation!

#### Aggregate Irrelevance of PTM

- Assume  $mc_t = w_t a_t$  and  $mc_t^* = w_t^* a_t^*$
- Solve for price levels (in the presence of PTM):

$$p_t = (1 - \gamma)(w_t - a_t) + \gamma(w_t^* + e_t - a_t^*),$$
  
 $p_t^* = (1 - \gamma)(w_t^* - a_t^*) + \gamma(w_t - e_t - a_t)$ 

• Therefore, RER is still (special case of Prop. 1):

$$q_t = (1 - 2\gamma) \big[ q_t^W - (a_t^* - a_t) \big]$$

• no extra comovement in  $q_t$  relative to  $e_t$  beyond  $q_t^W$ 

$$\circ~$$
 note that we can solve for:  $p_t = w_t - a_t + rac{\gamma}{1-2\gamma} q_t$ 

- How can this be?!
  - $\circ$  correlated heterogeneity in  $\alpha_i$  and  $\phi_i$

# FOREIGN-CURRENCY PRICE STICKINESS

## Monetary Model

• Simple general equilibrium model:

1 cash-in-advance,  $P_t C_t = M_t$  (instead of dynamic money demand)

- 2 log-linear utility,  $u_t = \log C_t L_t$  ("real neutrality"), which imples perfectly elastic labor supply at a wage rate  $W_t/P_t = C_t$
- **3** complete asset markets: Backus-Smith condition,  $C_t/C_t^* = Q_t$
- Immediate solution for wages and exchange rate:

$$w_t = m_t, \qquad w_t^* = m_t^*, \qquad ext{and} \qquad e_t = m_t - m_t^*$$

*m<sub>t</sub>* and *m<sup>\*</sup><sub>t</sub>* follow exogenous processes (random walk)
in particular: *q<sup>W</sup><sub>t</sub>* = *w<sup>\*</sup><sub>t</sub>* + *e<sub>t</sub>* - *w<sub>t</sub>* = 0 (assuming *a<sub>t</sub>* = *a<sup>\*</sup><sub>t</sub>* = 0)

• Sticky prices:  $\lambda$  is Calvo probability of non-adjustment

• desired prices  $\tilde{p}_{Ht} = w_t = m_t$  and  $\tilde{p}_{Ht}^* = w_t - e_t = m_t^* = \tilde{p}_{Ft}^*$ • reset prices  $\bar{p}_t = w_t = m_t$  and  $\bar{p}_t^* = w_t - e_t = m_t^*$ • price dynamics:  $p_t = \lambda p_{t-1} + (1 - \lambda)\bar{p}_t$ 

#### Real Exchange Rate

• Solving for RER:  $q_t = \lambda q_{t-1} + \lambda \Delta e_t + (1-\lambda) \bar{q}_t$ 

 $\circ$  however, reset RER:  $ar{q}_t = ar{p}_t^* + e_t - ar{p}_t = 0$   $(q_t^W = 0)$ 

• **Proposition 3** Under LCP, RER follows an AR(1) process:

$$q_t = \lambda q_{t-1} + \lambda \Delta e_t,$$

with iid innovation  $\lambda \Delta e_t$  and persistence  $\lambda$ .

- o falsification in the time series: CKM (2002), Blanco & Cravino
  - implied half-life is 3 quarters vs 4 years in the data
  - half-life:  $\lambda^h = 0.5$  with  $\lambda = 0.75$  quarterly
- o in the cross-section: Kehoe & Midrigan, Carvalho & Necchio
  - little heterogeneity in  $q_{z,t}$  across sectors with differential  $\lambda_z$
  - heterogeneous  $\lambda_z$  increase overall persistence of  $q_t \sim ARMA$
- o other implied puzzles: Itskhoki & Mukhin (2018, 2021)
  - Meese-Rogoff disconnect, Backus-Smith, Mussa
  - as a result of  $\mathcal{E} = M/M^* = PC/P^*C^*$

## Generalizations

- 1 Menu costs (vs Calvo): selection effects
- 2 Input-output linkages and strategic complementarities
- **3** Interest rate rule (vs money supply)
- adjustment in q<sub>t</sub> via jumps in e<sub>t</sub> vs p<sub>t</sub> dynamics (Engel 2019)
  PCP (vs LCP): LOP holds and q<sub>t</sub> = λq<sub>t-1</sub> + λ(1 2γ)Δe<sub>t</sub>
  Sticky wages:
  - $\begin{array}{l} \circ \quad q_t^W = \lambda_w q_{t-1}^W + \lambda_w \Delta e_t \quad \text{and} \quad \bar{q}_t = (1 2\gamma) \frac{1 \beta \lambda}{1 \beta \lambda \lambda_w} q_t^W \\ \circ \quad q_t = \lambda q_{t-1} + \lambda \Delta e_t + (1 \lambda) \bar{q}_t \sim ARMA(2, 1) \end{array}$
  - $\circ~\lambda_{\sf w} \to 1$  improves the fit of the model independently of  $\lambda$
- Why does the monetary sticky price model fail?
  - issue is not the structure of the model or nominal rigidities
  - it is the premise that monetary shocks are key drivers of  $(e_t, q_t)$

## Conclusion

- Mechanisms of LOP deviations do not change the qualitative relationship between  $e_t$  and  $q_t$ 
  - $\circ\;$  nonetheless, LOP deviations are important for individual prices
  - PTM and DCP essential for ToT (Proposition 2)
- Proposition 1 is still a good benchmark for RER:

$$q_t = (1-2\gamma)[q_t^W - (a_t^* - a_t)]$$

- $\,\circ\,$  two key ingredients: small  $\gamma$  and volatile and persistent  $q^W_t$
- $\circ\,$  variable markups, imported intermediates, firm heterogeneity, DCP/LCP further mute ERPT (reinforcing small  $\gamma)$
- The key outstanding issue is GE determination of (e<sub>t</sub>, q<sup>W</sup><sub>t</sub>, q<sub>t</sub>)
   limited role of specific type of PPP deviation (Lemma 1)